@Eric Bruckenstein China agreed to work with the org for several reasons, here's the link: https://en.odkb-csto.org/international_org/sco/. The Shanghai group includes Russia and most CSTO member states, but I agree with your point. China does not want to go head to head with NATO when relations with Europe and America are already fractured, so I think they will stick with some cooperation for anti-terrorism, arms trafficking, etc.

@Reid Parker That is a great point! Transfer of technology is already happening with some of the member states, especially Russia, in a lot of different areas but this sounds like it could be a step towards that more formal exchange. The CSTO website said the document "outlines points of agreement regarding the establishment and development of relations of equal and constructive cooperation between the secretariats of the SCO and the CSTO in ensuring regional and international security and stability; countering terrorism; fighting drug trafficking; disrupting arms trafficking; combating organised transnational crime; and other areas of mutual interest."

In reading today's document, the organizational structure/ goals of The Collective Security Treaty Organization sounds a lot like NATO's. Especially article 7 compared to NATO's article 5. I want to research more into how effective this org is compared to NATO in cooperation. China is also involved in the org, having signed a memorandum of understanding between CSTO and The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which is on the linked website. However, I think it would be highly unlikely China were to ever formerly join the org or agree to a defense pact. Most of the current agreement deals with cooperation between the two organizations.

The Three Seas Initiative sounds a lot like the BRI to me, although with somewhat clearer intent. Xi announced the BRI in 2013 and I have seen countless lookalikes since then; the race to connect regions is in full swing. In my opinion, these regional infrastructure connection projects raise global interdependence and lower the possibility of war. I also liked to see a focus to link post-Cold War Soviet countries in Europe to the rest of the western, developed continent. This Initiative could go a long way to removing the east-west/north-south economic divides in Europe. It's also no surprise to see the US fully backing the initiative, since much of the goal is to reduce energy reliance on Russia. 3SI and US economic/ security objectives are mostly aligned and the US would benefit greatly from increased demand of its natural gas supplies.

It would be very interesting to see a China-Russia partnership to enforce their control over new shipping lanes and strategic objectives in the Arctic. I fully believe they would push their differences aside if it meant taking control of this strategic region in the face of the US and its allies partnering together.

It's interesting to read about these lesser-known multinational security organizations. I noticed NORDEFCO's goal to increase joint participation in military exercises, something China will assuredly be against. China has lambasted every joint-exercise in the Indo-Pacific as a threat to their security and/or sovereignty. I think NORDEFCO will be an important factor in the rush for the arctic and will more than likely come at odds with China's economic/ security objectives in the arctic region.

I like your point, but I also wonder if there is a risk of them unifying under a single cause? I took note of these groups using concerts and venues to network with other factions and I think this presents a greater threat of them potentially unifying to carry out a larger scale attack, possibly across borders.

While there is little to no white-supremacist attacks in China, I appreciated the chapter's focus on the interconnectivity of these extremist groups. It amazes me that Europe's far-right extremist groups use music venues and concerts to network between the groups. While thee groups remain largely are independent to each other, their ability to coordinate a possible large-scale attack is heightened by these networking events. The "Rock against Communism" music genre was noted as a massive unifying event for these groups. I believe events like this, meant to side-step home country bans on specific groups, create a greater security risk for Europe as a whole than any one group could pose.

I hope more and more countries attempt to distinguish between political radicalisation and mental health issues. There seem to be many commonalities between the two, but very different causes of each.

I agree that people struggling with mental health are more susceptible to radicalizing traps online, but I would almost take it a step further. I think, especially with The Hague stabbings, actions of a paranoid schizophrenic could look very much like those of a terrorist. Sometimes they don't need to be radicalized at all and could just be acting out on their mental disorder.

I liked that the Europol Jihadist Terrorism chapter gave a precise and clear definition of what Jihadism is and who would be classified as a Jihadi terrorist. This helps policymakers/ judges to better understand the characteristics of this type of extremism and how to better combat radicalization towards Jihadism. China could take note of definitions like these, which would enable them to better identify suspected terrorists in the PRC. Because China does not have a clear definition of any type of terrorism, they employ a mass surveillance and detention strategy of suspect demographics, such as the Uyghurs of Xinjiang. There have been legitimate extremist attacks in the province, such as the needle attacks in 2009, but labeling any Uyghur's that hold anti-CCP views as extremists have resulted in the reported 1.5 million detainees in their re-education camps. China has a complicated argument to make in justifying these mass detentions in the name of combating terrorist extremism. I also appreciated the chapters linkage of mental health and terrorism. Many extremist tendencies/ actions are very similar to tendencies of those combating mental health disorders. Regarding The Hague stabbings in May of 2018, the judge presiding over the case determined his actions were the result of his paranoid psychosis, eve though his actions appeared to be a terrorist act. Mental health disorders could present symptoms similar to extremism and I am happy to see institutions like Europol are distinguishing between the two.

I really appreciate that you brought up the individual right to privacy regarding encrypted messages. My family in China would only communicate through WhatsApp (before the encryption was leaked) because they did not want the PRC invading their privacy. China can take monitoring peoples messages/ social media posts online a bit far. This is especially true in Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and Tibet; any message not favorable to the CCP can be flagged as a national security/ terrorist threat. They do not have individual rights to privacy for this reason, so anything you say can be monitored and/or censored. I think Chinese culture and society would greatly benefit from an individual right to privacy.

It would be interesting to see how an EU-style market would do in SA. This sounds like a great tool to combat terrorism and its financing networks in the region, but since most members have withdrawn it is largely obsolete. Could South America create a better-functioning institution, or are there too many political barriers creating too many costs for membership?

While I could not find anything to relate to my specialty, I took a particular notice to the document's suggestion to combat the financing networks that provide terrorist organizations resources to carry out attacks. I think the Financial Intelligence Units (FIU) would be vital to stemming terrorist attacks globally. If they can't fund the operation, then terrorist attacks would surely become more and more rare. Cross-border access to suspicious bank accounts could also help the FIU's combat foreign terrorist financing. As Eric mentioned above, I believe an individual right to privacy should always be on policymakers minds. It is very easy to go down the wrong path in the name of combating extremism/ terrorism.

I like that you also took notice to regulating extremist content online. The big social media platforms in the US (Twitter, facebook, etc.) have for some time regulated foreign extremist groups ability to recruit on their platforms, but there is still much debate about domestic extremism. The first amendment does not give every citizen the ability to say whatever they wish; "fighting words" that construct a clear and present danger/ imminent lawless action are still prohibited under the SC ruling in Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969) and Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire (1942). It will be interesting to see the debate unfold on whether extreme social media speech could present the criteria for fighting words.

I agree that the US counter-terrorism document we read last week failed to adequately apply human rights to the strategy, but I also feel this will significantly change with the Biden Administration. As we discussed, last week's document was intentionally political and there are visible signs of a shifting US stance on human rights. Biden's first call with Chinese President, Xi Jinping, highlighted the CCP's human rights abuses as a primary concern for US policy towards China. But I still agree, the US historically has not been as persistent in pursuing advancements in human rights as Europe. Hopefully Biden can usher in a new era of advancing human rights on behalf of the United States.

The concept that stood out to me the most was the use of new technologies and how they can contribute to the protection of public spaces if they are used in a well-defined, targeted and proportionate manner. Facial recognition software is a fast growing tool used to identify terrorists/ suspicious items in public spaces using AI softwares and reference databases of known terrorists. China could take a particular note to the "well-defined, targeted, and proportionate manner" section of this concept. China has long used facial recognition software on its citizens, often with a massively broad scope. China has no public definition of what a terrorist is, and it can be assumed the CCP's private definition is not one used by the international community. China also does not use its facial recognition software in a targeted manner, yet there are no public documents outlining their use of the software so there is no way to know for sure. Chinese citizens have been detained or imprisoned for very simple things like government dissention, such as the Uyghurs in Xinjiang. The PRC also uses this tactic across its entire territory, falling short of the proportionate aspect of the EU INTCEN. The 1.5 million detainees in Xinjiang are most assuredly not all radical extremists. China has, and will continue to, receive international criticism for its AI and facial recognition programs until the CCP creates a clear, well-defined, and precise program for its facial recognition software.

I found it interesting that DHS has a list of possible indicators that could predict WSE violence before it happens. While most of these are constitutionally protected, ticking several of these boxes could be an accurate indicator of future radicalization to violence. China employs similar indicators to extremism within its borders, heavily monitored and censored on all forms of social media. Some of these I have stated in the past, such as the posting of Islamic prayers on WeChat. Although the CCP's actions against their Uyghur population are meant to combat terrorist ideologies, the parallels between American WSE and domestic terrorist extremism in Xinjiang are striking. There have been attacks by Uyghur extremists against minority group, the Han Chinese, in the Xinjiang province and China approaches the issue similar to how the US approaches WSE. Both of these issues are seen by their respective States as a domestic terrorist threat.

I agree about your turning a blind eye point. I feel as though the term "white supremacist" is reserved in many Americans minds for the lynchings and burning crosses at the height of the KKK. Refusing to help minority communities in distress is just as important; as with the delayed law enforcement reaction to the Tulsa Massacre where factions of supremacist groups were largely left unchecked to wreak havoc on a minority community. Turning a blind eye to mistreatment is all the same as participating in the mistreatment, especially as a law enforcement officer.

I liked your point about infiltration. How is it that these officers get a job in the first place? I think it has something to do with rising sympathies among already established law enforcement officers. It's hard to prevent infiltration if the one vetting candidates is sympathetic to their cause.