Indo-Pacific and East Asian Overview

Today's statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China left me curious. I wasn't aware of how impactful Pompeo's well-wishes to Taiwan was, until reading the statement. I initially thought that the One-China principle was only related to economic purposes, so seeing the direct response from China is interesting. I wonder how the Biden administration will develop relations with Taiwan, and whether previous actions under Trump will impact relations with China.

The matter with Taiwan seemed to have repeated itself again in 2020. I had forgotten by now about Pompeo's and other US lawmakers' comments specifically congratulating Taiwan last year, but what had stayed in my memory was when President Tsai called to congratulate then President-elect Trump in 2016. At the time, Trump had accepted her congratulations and referred to her as "President" too, marking the first time a US President spoke with a Taiwanese President in over 3 decades. China had tried to downplay the significance of the phone call as "shenanigans" from Tsai at the time. With this Chinese government website using such strong language to double down on their core interests with Taiwan means China was not so forgiving for the next time. It's no surprise as relations had continuously worsened for US-China during those 4 years. As of now, Biden is also continuing Trump's direction, but we will see what happens in an upcoming Alaskan meeting as the first meeting between officials from both countries. Personally speaking as a Chinese American though, I do find modern-day Taiwan as a "what could've been" alternative to China, and do sorely hope the country continues its longetivity in the future. After all, the KMT was the original Chinese government before China had turned into the PRC after the civil wars (though Tsai's party is the Democratic Progressive Party and is more pro-American than her predecessor being more closely aligned with Beijing).

Prior to the reading today, I was well aware of China's views regarding Taiwan, and thus the document didn't hold anything particularly new for me. I share @David Broughton's curiosity as the United States' stance post-1972 and the Taiwan Relations Act. As to the document itself, it strikes me as typically dramatic, but should not be taken as a true threat.

As many of the comments have mentioned, I too found it strange to see the language used in somewhat of a violent manner. China is clear on the fact that whoever interferes or makes a wrong move towards its policy, will face consequences. In addition, the sentence that said "there is only one China in the world", when in fact that is true, it does not sit well with me. I think that China is looking to take over the world in a not so democratic fashion.

China uses very aggressive language in reacting to the United States statements by saying "We want to make it solemnly clear to the US side that the agenda for 'Taiwan independence' will go nowhere. Any attempt to embolden or support separatist elements is doomed to fail. Any action that jeopardizes China's core interests and interferes in China's internal affairs will be met with forceful reaction from the Chinese side." The issue is that China does not recognize Taiwan so they think that the United States is meddling in their internal affairs. For the United States, it sees Taiwan as a separate entity and they are trying to better their relations with a completely different country. The United States and China seem to always be at odds because of the stark differences between the countries. Both are world powers that are trying to push their agendas and assert their ideas around the world. I understand that the United States recognizing Taiwan can be seen as undermining the Chinese government, but I also believe that Taiwan should have the right to separate if they don't want to be governed by the PRC.

The strong language stating that "nothing could stop the historical trend toward China's reunification" and that Taiwanese separatist movements were "doomed to fail" really caught my attention. China was clear that it would take necessary measures and the US would face consequences for "meddling in internal affairs."

In the final days of the Trump Administration, Secretary Pompeo declared the Chinese treatment of the Uighur people as a genocide. While I view this as the a necessary step, the Biden Administration is now left with the aftermath. Secretary Blinken has reaffirmed the classification of genocide. As the Sino-US relations appear currently strained, I wonder how the relationship will change during the new administration as Biden has promised to shift to more diplomatic efforts.

I thought it was interesting in today's reading that China sees Taiwan as an "inseparable part of the Chinese Territory". This make sense considering the PRC still somewhat follows the 1992 Consensus, which both countries agreed there was only one China, but allows for differing interpretations into what that "one China" looks like. Taiwan's President has basically done away with the consensus after Pres. Xi in a speech related it to the one country, two systems framework. Xi's formula would make Taiwan an SAR like Hong Kong and Macau, which is seen as too extreme in Taiwan.

The three communiques referenced in the document were also interesting, since Nixon promised to not interfere in Chinese sovereignty issues in 1972. I wonder if this is still the US's stance, even the highly referenced Taiwan Relations Act does not guarantee intervention in a China-Taiwan conflict. I could see the sale of defensive weapons to Taiwan, which is required in the act, as threatening to the PRC's sovereignty since the "taiwan question" is a domestic issue in the eyes of Beijing.

Today's document is quite interesting especially after the recent issues within the South China Sea. Japan's plans for security and their economic priorities seem like good starts to forming an alternative to the Chinese BRI but it will take quite a bit more then just Japan working on these programs to have China's allies change sides. Japan's efforts are pebbles against rapids and unless Japan really feels that it could deal with China on its own, then anything that is done by Japan is just a first step to an American plan. Japan is a great ally in the South China Sea but it does not have the ability to stand up to China. Still very interesting read and helps show a possible plan for the United States.

Piracy is an interesting note. I usually think of the other items mentioned in the 1st page's red center, though earlier research did mention how the US & China collaborated on anti-piracy military exercises together (“first-ever joint counter-piracy exercise in the Gulf of Aden . . . U.S. invitation for China to participate in RIMPAC . . . [and an] agreement to cohost a Pacific Army Chiefs Conference with China”) during Obama administration (Saunders, 2013). Aside from that, Japan's goals of general peace & rules-based international order for freedom of navigation among others do reflect the US goal (not surprised considering the US pretty much designed Japan in its democratic image after WWII).

The feasibility of actually achieving its vision for the Indo-Pacific is questionable. The territory covers such wide areas, and Japan's economy has pretty much been in a recession for 30+ years now too (though it is usually considered as major economic powers alongside US and EU). Saying that it will cooperate with any state that shares its goals is good because it's not likely they can do it alone even without China to consider. That being said, their image of the Indo-Pacific is the biggest concept of Indo-Pacific compared to anybody else. India, Australia and the US have much smaller concepts of the labelled region compared to Japan. So cooperation may need more unity in conceptual understanding when it gets to the outer layers. It is in the midst of enhancing its maritime law enforcement currently though, so that may be a plus (but that was aimed primarily for Senkaku/Diaoyu Island disputes). Its pursuit of economic prosperity goals do echo the same points ASEAN's 3 pillars made, so that could be mutually beneficial relationship. Disaster relief could be their strong point given Japan's highly extensive history with disasters (the 2011 triple threat of earthquake, tsunami and nuclear incidents) with its geography.

What was more valuable about the document though was its huge comprehensive display of ongoing and finished connectivity and infrastructure these states have with each other to give much better context for the region as a whole. The last chart also gave indications of priorities and challenges each state has unique to them (i.e. now I know Nepal probably has a bunch of earthquakes due to the need for earthquake infrastructure). However, it would be better to see what means specifically Japan has in store to provide for all of this infrastructure. I'm not too sure what their military capability is like if its self-defense nature has any impact on its ability to carry out these projects.

Was this document published in 2016? I'm asking because it was Japan that led the Indo-Pacific idea starting off in 2007 when Prime Minister Shinzo Abe called the Indian Ocean and the Pacific one common space in his speech "Confluence of the two seas" in New Delhi (though the Indo-Pacific term wasn't quite coined yet). He proposed the security alliance Quad for the four corners of this region (India, Australia, Japan, US). The FOIP Strategy (Free and Open Indo-Pacific) was in strategy papers after his speech in 2016 in Nairobi. However, if it was not in 2016 but after 2018, then this document is in line with a "vision" instead of "strategy". The "strategy" could have been aimed to contain China, but "vision" since 2018 has signaled for Abe's FOIP vision to coexist and complement with China's BRI. That's what makes Japan including Africa in this document an interesting choice, as that either spells out direct competition with China or collaboration.

As I've stated in other posts, Japan and China have been making efforts for political relations warming up. So this distinction is quite a marked difference. South and Southeast Asian neighbors also criticized Abe's original anti-Chinese strategy being too strong and too security policy oriented.

In any case, more on the Indo-Pacific can be found here: https://www.linkedin.com/posts/crystal-lin-b54b0215a_from-asia-pacific-to-indo-pacific-activity-6765223400626622464-xdgX

Japan-specific info can be found on pages 10 and 17-21.

The document of US vs. China influence has been helpful in getting straight to the point matter-of-factly. I definitely built up the same feeling for the 2nd key finding on breaking down US and Chinese attractiveness for the neighboring states in both Northeast & Southeast Asia, so it was validating to see that (not to mention all the Chinese businesses in SE Asia driving more economic ties). These states don't spend much on their military either, so they definitely care more about the economic relationship than security ones.

Australia has been against China in at least the past half year from what I could tell, and as a democratic state the alignment isn't there despite China being its largest trading partner. Philippines have been trying to move closer to China with Duterte, but generally will be in US camp end of the day. China is also Japan's largest trading partner too, and Japan and China diplomatically tries to increase engagement with each other, but economic ties have still been lagging to recover from anti-Japanese demonstrations (2012), Japan's own weak economy and yen, and other maritime political squabbles. Ultimately, Japan depends on US for military. So all of this does fall in line to the cautious dance these surrounding neighbors have towards US & China, but the document underestimates the agency these states assert for their own priorities when ping ponging around both states (or at least doesn't go into their perspectives per main research questions). The 4th category's last point is expected with the neighboring states. The intent is aligning with the US for ultimate security at the end of the day if it really comes down to it, but realities of the current day are economic priorities in a growing, dynamic region. Thus caution and opportunistic mindsets are kept in a balancing act and prefer not to choose between the US & China.

The framework could show different results depending on variables being measured and how to measure. Why were only these 9 countries measured? South Korea isn't in here. Including Australia is a little irrelevant as distance is so huge from the region, yet it's included cuz of Indo-Pacific conceptual reorganization to benefit the US (thus the report is already including a region with actors shaped for US leaning). In any case, it's a little curious there is no mention of QUAD for security ties since Key #4 emphasize Australia, Japan and India.

Research for 2018 & 2019 adequately covered the sentiment of the influence game, but 2020 has also felt accelerated authoritarian tones from China with hostage and wolf warrior diplomacy and other coerciveness that it's worth taking another look into updated public opinion (especially since research is more from institutional reports like RAND rather than societal feedback from the people... People have power after all like protests with Japan for historical reasons or Anti-Chinese sentiment from surrounding neighbors that can hurt economic influence). It's not a surprise US is leading in the diplomatic side. As stated, China does diplomacy too, both coercive and being a "good neighbor" that wants shared prosperity for all, but people aren't fooled (I think the Korean society has an overwhelming poll opinion of China probably being unreliable for security reasons if the peninsula had war).

The US & Chinese objectives reflect certain IR theories. Analyzing through a systemic level, great powers work to keep their powers. The rising would want a bigger share of the pie. It's like a "this town isn't big enough for the both of us" sentiment in terms of relative power to each other. According to Mearsheimer, regional hegemons will work to prevent the rise of other regional hegemons. If they could dilute their power in that region of the world, rising powers would be too busy trying to gain influence in their corner of the world to make it to the general International stage and potentially strike the existing regional hegemon.

Analyzing through a state level: Ultimately, China is this type of state. "I am the father and the country is my son. I provide for you and raise you up. How dare you not appreciate what I do for you?" Meanwhile, the US is the opposite, "We the people give you government the power to serve us." For China, they don't really have a history of democracy to be familiar with. They have a history of somewhat moral Confucian beliefs for the "father-son" on both macro and micro levels, as well as a family culture driven by fear in needing to look out for/monitor each other. In ancient China, when one messes up, the entire street dies (modern day examples include North Korea with its 3 family generations going to jail if one commits a crime). The collectivist culture comes from the need to not be selfish, since one person's actions affects all. Thus, it would be quite hard to hope for a changed China that the West believed will happen back in the 90s. Whether to continue pursuit of this avenue of democratization, I'm not too sure.