For the Climate Change and Security in the Arctic document, it's interesting to see how the document reaffirms that the Northern Sea Route, though it will gain more prominence in upcoming decades and already has been, still doesn't hold a candle compared to the southern routes strategically speaking. However, due to the recent Suez Canal incident with Ever Given, the Russians did use that opportunity to promote the Arctic sea routes for trade. On the other hand, it probably would still be easier to expand and improve the Suez Canal rather than have the Arctic as the game changer route. Further, I would think that if companies were to prioritize oil and shipping route potential for purely economic gains, an Uncurbed Scenario would maximize those prospects. So this report was a bit counterintuitive to me. After all, Russia was projected to suffer from a Curbed Scenario more than an Uncurbed one. Though I do understand the destabilizing effects of everything else, even the economic long-term costs like needing to maintain infrastructure more in a rapidly shifting environment. In addition, I think there's less certainty in the importance of the Arctic under a Curbed Scenario since gas and oil is the reigning supreme for the Arctic right now, yet the Curbed Scenario won't place emphasis in that dimension due to shifting to renewable energy. Shipping routes also means downplaying the strategic interests of going to the Arctic in the Curbed Scenario since the ice won't melt as much to become as accessible as possible like the Uncurbed Scenario. A truly Curbed Scenario basically encourages less activity there. What I mean is with examples like The Arctic Shipping Corporate Pledge to not send ships there, and the overall activity there will obviously cause further impact to the environment when you lay down infrastructures. Activity in the Arctic and climate change, or more downscale regional environmental degradation, feed into each other as a feedback loop after all. "But mineral extraction, including potentially sub-sea extraction, commercial fishing and tourism are also emerging as areas for commercial expansion" does make me think that Asian diets (Chinese, Japanese, etc.) have a huge appetite for seafood. The Chinese in particular have become major tourists of the world in the past decade or so, thus I could see China gaining interest here too for their people with consumer needs, desires, travel, etc. "...increased activity also makes the region more prone to accidents, which can not only lead to loss of life, but also be a source of misunderstanding between states" also reminds me of the fear of militarization to potentially destabilize the South China Sea. In the past, similar accidents happened with the Hainan Island incident in 2001. There was a collision between American and PRC pilots that resulted in the Chinese pilot's death. Both countries had disagreed on the legality of the flights by US naval aircraft in the area. The US remained neutral in the Paracel Islands dispute with Vietnam, but patrolled the sea regularly with military ships and planes under "freedom of navigation" notion. Both sides blamed each for the collision, but this is one example of accidental incidents that could result from many players in the same area without good communication (thus the report's recommendation for the military to adopt a diplomatic apparatus). Regardless, I predict that China will also operate under the same "gray zone" operations that Russia has been doing with the Arctic. In the meantime, China, South Korea, Japan and Singapore are all observers to the Arctic Council since 2013. Speaking of the Arctic Council, the 2011 "Arctic SAR Agreement notes that 'Parties shall ensure assistance be provided to any person in distress' but does not specify the resources that parties are obliged to provide" reminds me of how NATO conducts a similar leeway. Article 5 of NATO has a clause at the backend that no one really talks about (at the insistence of Congress I believe) on how “each member state shall respond as they see fit”. So it could mean “we’re behind you with troops” or “we’ll support you and stand on the sideline to applaud”. So both the Arctic Council and NATO have similar language in their documents that could leave ambiguity of how member states shall support a broader cause. Questions: What happened in 2011 to make the Russians decrease their cargo tonnage in the Russian Arctic? What does "Track II dialogues" mean on page 15? Other thoughts: - It was interesting to see "This is especially important because we know from other theatres – e.g., Georgia and Ukraine – that military tactics are evolving towards relying on hybrid and 'gray zone' operations" as it connects to our NATO meeting we held with Juanita and Jay discussing these items. - In the future, I bet there will probably be another founding regional alliance documents regarding the Arctic for the BIED Society to analyze like prior IAA documents (ASEAN, AU, MERCOSUR, etc.). - I agree with how "Seemingly stable states can be overburdened by the combined pressures of climate change" since I've heard of multiple professionals (from a documentary with a Bangladesh professional concerned about climate refugees and my professor who knew someone from FEMA) that society is basically only 3 meals away from anarchy. If the state cannot produce 3 meals for people, then people will take matters into their own hands for survival. Putting that into perspective (and its logical sense for the basic necessities of human survival), state legitimacy and monopoly of power/force/violence could be easily threatened enough in the face of the 21st Century's stressors.