This week's documents shall explore the governance of and the current dynamics in the conflict-ridden Middle East. Share your perspectives here as the documents are posted throughout the week.

This week's documents shall explore the governance of and the current dynamics in the conflict-ridden Middle East. Share your perspectives here as the documents are posted throughout the week.
Overall the Saudi Arabia-Iran document had educated me by a huge degree and I may refer back to it for future work or dialogue referring to the Middle East, but I do wish it had citations. Each of the regional proxy areas were hard to parse through, but to my understanding, Iran always had influence in Iraq. In 2010, Iraq pushes against Iranian influence. No one likes a unified Iraq, so they tried to undermine Iraq's efforts but failed. Iran had an ally in Iraq's Prime Minister, who had his policies of oversectarianism leading to ISIS & Iraq city Mosul falling. That sounds bad from the surface for Iraq overall government stability, but this somehow benefits a political party gaining power in 2018 parliamentary elections. That party is a Shi'a rival to Iran. So this is why Iran failed in its efforts to control Iraq, despite having more direct interventions since 2014. What this document doesn't say is why ISIS leads to that political party getting stronger, but I can speculate perhaps that they probably blamed Iran for ISIS to the masses, and that only their party can probably protect the country. It also doesn't quite say if Nouri al-Maliki's policies were at the behest of Iran's plans for influence pushback against 2010 Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq trying to refuse Iran's bidding. In the end though, Sairoun Coalition was the Shi'a party to benefit, not sure if the initial 2010 Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq had their Shi'a party also benefit.
For Lebanon, does Saudi Arabia provide funding for the Beirut explosion last year like they did with the 2006 reconstruction? It's interesting that Lebanon and Bahrain gets monetary and political influence rather than war/conflict in the other states. For Bahrain's case, did Bahrain's ruling family used GCC support to repress their own people?
For Syria's case, Saudi Arabia has used their own agency to try and force the US on what to do, but Iran perceives the US (and Israel) as the one controlling Saudi Arabia as a tool.
For Europe's case, is the E3 still considered as such when the UK has backed out of the EU by now? Nevertheless, UK probably still has stakes in the JCPOA.
For the US, which US policy in 2011 are they talking about? The US left Iraq but why is it mentioning Saudi worries for Bahrain? Is this regarding the 2011 Arab Spring?
As for the conclusion, "there will not be a spontaneously generated grand accord" might be a bit outdated since Israel and Saudi Arabia had their developments happening last year.
I think that it is important to highlight that in these disputes both sides are using the same arguments to legitimize their attacks against each other. "Each is Islamist in devising its political purpose, both having used that to oppose rival ideologies." It is good that they mentioned where Europe stands on these issues. Even though they are not a major actor, they are still involved. I think that it is good to know where the world powers stand, even if they aren't at the center of the issue. If someone supports the United States or Russia it could cause a big swing if conflict arises. Europe usually sides with the USA over Russia and it would be interesting to see what would happen if serious conflict arose.
I appreciate that, even though Europe collectively does not play as big a role in the Persian Gulf conflict as does the US or Russia, the document sees fit to include it among the international players in the rivalry. The EU in particular seems to function as the Western counterweight to the United States, attempting to establish a better working relationship with Iran so Tehran doesn't see fit to write off productive relations with the West completely.
US favoritism of Saudi Arabia - even before Trump - is completely expected. The two have a significant arms trade relationship and the US has been at odds with Iran ever since the Iranians overthrew the US-backed authoritarian Shah in the 1979 revolution. Given the historical context of how the US propped up that regime for so many years, it's understandable why it is so difficult to foster functioning agreements between Tehran and Washington.
This document was a real eye-opener for me, I was guilty of the overly-reductionist view of the region prior to the reading. I can't see an East Asian great power such as China really becoming directly involved in the situation because they have no pressing issue that would force them to directly intervene, although I agree with @Patrick Borchert and @David Broughton that China still has a lot of energy interests in the region.
The Saudi-Arabian rivalry is very complex and is often oversimplified as the conflict between Sunni and Shiʿa ideologies. As the document pointed out, the regional issues will take a lot of time to address as neither has the ability to truly defeat the other. Per usual, Russia is involved. However, Putin likes to spread out his interests, so the Kremlin has not taken a strong stance for one side. US-Iran relations have been growing especially under anti-Western interests. Russia also wants to maintain relations with Saudi Arabia, especially regarding oil and to avoid a price war.
Today's document was interesting because it gave a brief overview of the ongoing conflict and rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia. I found it interesting to see how different western countries reacted towards the conflict. And as my colleagues have mentioned, the conflict leaves an opportunity for China to expand its investments and to grow its economy in the region.
The Persian Gulf is rich in not only oil and gas but also a lot of opportunity for China and Chinese shipping. The document gave quite the detailed breakdown of the Persian Gulf conflict and while the Persian Gulf is fighting it leaves an opening for China. China already has expanded its naval influence in the region, and time goes along will only expand that already massive influence. China is stabalizing influence within the region, with investments from Beijing trying to keep the region content. China will not back either side, because the amount that it would cost to fight with one side would be cost more then siding with either. By China walking in with the agenda of neutrality it has lead to their continued naval success in the region and especially their BRI programs.
Today's document over the Persian Gulf conflict was a good background to its regional instability. Regarding China, its strategy in the gulf is to essentially stay out of regional political disputes while maintaining economic relations with all countries involved. This is likely because of China's strong appetite for more energy resources like oil and natural gas. China also has several partnerships with regional countries to enhance the BRI and provide financial investment to the gulf states. China's economy benefits greatly from a stable middle east and they are likely to try to maintain the status quo of regional order to meet their economic objectives.
"The Line" seems as if it will be a great investment into sustainable development. I was questioning if the project will be built the same way Dubai was built by migrant workers. While the project sounds commendable, the opportunity cost behind it is unclear. In connection to Latin America, more cities are adopting sustainable development techniques in order to increase tourism while reducing the carbon footprint. However, countries like Saudi Arabia have more resources to implement projects like this one while hiring international workers to do most of the difficult work. I wonder if we will see any human rights abuses as a result of this project, given how short the time constraint is for the building time.