African Overview

China in Africa document: The CCP prioritizes a different type of human rights wherein they seek material stability with satisfying socioeconomic conditions for its citizens rather than political or civil rights. I have heard of how Boris Yeltsin was seen as a reformer in the 90s to take Russia out of the Communist past and into a Western democratic tradition the US could collaborate with. However, he was also incompetent. Russia had taken steps to be more democratic with elections and building those political institutions needed, but had economic disaster at the time. So people had learned on the surface about freedom and voting, but didn't mean too much at the end of the day if jobs, pensions and whatever else were gone. So when Putin came into power, he's more competent and boosted the economy considerably. That's what made him popular despite the democratic roll backs. In a parallel, I'd say China knows that they need to keep their population and growing middle class well-resourced to meet consumption needs in order to maintain political stability of the state (and here the CCP has assumed itself as the state pretty much).

Having the document say it signed on to the "International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights" and "International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights in 1966" but not ratifying the latter makes it clearer that it is the economic human rights type they prioritize over the political and civil rights.

The hukou bit was a tad confusing. "20% of the urban population having 'hukou' status (that is, no permanent residency rights in cities)" struck me as inaccurate. Hukou is supposed to be a sort of household registry system wherein the government assigned resources to you based on where you resided. It's a pretty powerful measure to maintain social control actually, as the document had stated, and gives parallels of the migrants illegally entering the US. Except here it is the rural people to urban centers within their own state. Your rights would not be entitled in the cities without that hukou status, such as attaining education. Back a few decades, you couldn't even go to urban areas and eat food in restaurants there as a rural person without permission from your employer on a business trip.

So I'm not sure where the "no permanent residency rights" comes from, as there is both a rural and urban hukou assigned for people. I could be misinterpreting what the document is saying though.

As for the 2012 Rule of Law 4th Plenum, it's interesting to see how Hu Jintao had stated China's aim to participate more for international affairs. At around this time, the Obama administration had a 3-front strategy to Rebalance to Asia: increased engagement of diplomacy, security, and economics. For all three, the US interacted with the Asian neighbors, but also were careful to balance interacting with China for China too. So Obama administration had tried to encourage China in taking up more "responsible leadership" in international affairs - to which China was wary of getting locked into commitments that may hinder their future growth. Nonetheless, they agreed to more cooperation, so Hu's statement may have reflected that dynamic at the time.

"Under such conditions of increasing US unilateralism" China had pretty much swooped into the world stage every time the Trump administration had pulled back. Potential signaling of power vacuums are attractive for a returning state/rising power after all. But what's most important is not necessarily that China is assuming leadership, but to ensure they uphold the current liberal system with rule of law, human rights, etc.

With Africa, the World Bank and other international actors do help with African economies somewhat, but at the expense of furthering inequality in people as I've said before. This document also observes the extreme poverty of 400 million Africans with increasing income inequality. They need to remedy practices of attaching conditions w/o local input. "...only private sector investment and free trade" as the solution for the continent dominates the Western governments' mindset. This document also admonishes that. However, it seems China also contributes to this problem with their FDI investing in only 6 countries due to being mineral resource rich - the exact problem identified prior and addressed to need wider diversification of investments to non-mineral-dependent states. China is also similar to other international actors (like MNCs) with "eliminating investment barriers with implications for deregulation and stability, again affecting labor and environmental rights" as this creates a Race to the Bottom scenario.

China follows suit of the international direction like the UN's SDGs and AU's Agenda 2063 with its BRI. However, just like they support the post-9/11 terrorism priority consensus as an excuse for their domestic policies, I find suspicions that here BRI simultaneously plants the seed for future Chinese use to control and potentially alter the international system once it gains more power. Although the international system has benefitted them greatly thus far, who's to say it will continue to uphold it in the future? The past doesn't exactly dictate future behavior after all. It is in this question that remains a vexing topic for me to figure out though. Using the 76 ports in 34 countries for naval vessels is more than simply economic dealings when there is military links (unless the military is a natural part of international trade that I am unaware of).

Point 5 of "people-to-people" contacts is perhaps the greatest evidence of US fears being justified that China exports its domestic style of authoritarianism unto the world stage with its foreign policy. If not for that fear, it would be easier to accept a possible "inevitable overtaking of US economy" and whatnot.

The document declaring that "human rights implications" needs to be examined as consequences of BRI is also similar to World Bank's conditional loans' effects on human rights violations. Though with China specifically, it just builds up a worse picture of undermining democratization on the world stage.

Advocating for Internet governance that thereby relegates civil society at a disadvantage is also troubling for a pluralistic democracy.

Stating "global governance reform" pushes past the responsible international leadership narrative into altering it from Xi's 2018 "40th Anniversary of the Reform and Opening-Up Forum".

Yet this document also concludes that "Western concerns are to some extent disingenuous", and that BRI is motivated by security concerns instead of simply economic ones. That suggests that China does feel some threat to its growth with Western powers shooting itself in the foot by overtures of containment. Really, a balancing act of "cooperative rivalry" Joseph Nye states may be needed here.

Remaining thoughts: I do like how this document builds on top of prior documents' knowledge reinforcing each other to drive certain points home. Examples include mentions of principle drivers of African growth included "spread of information technology" which points to the Infrastructure report concluding the ICT sector is most significant.

The "few exceptions" of African governments viewing BRI and China's broader presence is intriguing. Are they aligned with Western money more (have better diplomatic relations)?

How will China keep up pay for this massive BRI program? Ironically enough, the drive for political stability via material gain (wealth) and effective governance backfires when reactionary groups threaten social order (understandably so when authoritarianism presses harder).

For the African Infrastructure Development Index (AIDI), it was interesting to see the negative COVID impacts towards African infrastructure development. I had heard last year that there were some concerns that Africa may be particularly hit hard with COVID, yet they had actually turned out better than what people had feared. The demographic makeup of large youth base and lessons learned from previous outbreaks such as Ebola had prepared their systems better in the face of the current pandemic. That's why it was interesting to see that "heightened investment risk aversion" among others had reflected that fear. The debt burdens placed from the need to redistribute resources and government attention to the pandemic away from other needs and economic developments, however, made more sense.

Seeing that Central Africa was placed last in the subregional rankings also made sense to me in the broader context of geopolitics and history. Historically and even now, coastal cities are the major hubs for civilization. Geopolitically, a state has easier access and self-sufficiency in resources, trade routes, etc., when they're not as landlocked as Central Africa. I suspect its geography to be the biggest factor behind its lag in development. After all, the African Union goals document had also stated the need to leverage its surrounding ocean, and even this document had stated the 2015-2020 period implemented new regional submarines and terrestrial cables. Improving in this area would be a vital boon.

The bottom 10 countries remaining unchanged including Ethiopia and Eritrea wasn't surprising given the conflicts going on. Latest developments even after this was published would be the Tigray people genocide. If a state is unstable, the government would have harder time consolidating its capacity to enact developments, especially with conflicts disrupting existent society and infrastructure. I also predicted that South Africa would be included in the top 10 rankings given that it's part of BRICS status. As for why, I'm not as sure on that point.

I'm glad that the article brought up the subject of the Chinese merchantile outlook in the context of the Chinese expanding their sphere of influence into Africa, perhaps most directly represented by the extension of BRI initiatives into the continent.

The building of Africa has been a plan of China for a very long time. With China being the largest funder in Africa and from the document we see the countries that China is investing in are all mineral rich. From an economic standpoint China is investing in Africa to give itself access to growing markets that are mineral rich and open to new Chinese goods. From a maritime perspective China has the world's largest navy and also is looking to increase their projected naval power throughout the world. With Chinese entities overlooking the construction or expansion of 41 of 46 sub-Sahran African ports and another 46 ports throughout Africa being funded and aligned with Chinese objectives. The grasp on Africa by China is quite tight but the future of China on the continent is only as strong as their investments at the moment and until domestic powers are able to stop China or a foreign power steps in then China's power will grow in Africa. China's Maritime Belt and Road is growing shipping between Asia and Africa and with it a market a growth in the market that China will use to grow their own economy, most likely at the expense of Africa.

I thought the mention of the irony of China's investment in Africa was important. While China supports Africa by providing capital and infrastructure, China's governance model is not in line with the need for effective governance to achieve sustainable development. Russia, like China, is becoming more illiberal and extending its geopolitical power in Africa. However, Russia tends to focus more on military strength and involvement rather than FDI.

It is interesting to learn how China is dependent on Africa's resources to maintain its GDP growth as @Griffen Ballenger mentioned in his post. China is quickly taking the lead when it comes to global investment. While China's investment in Africa seems like a positive thing, the question is, is China only interested in Africa for a personal gain?

I did not realize the extent to which China relied on Africa for maintenance of its GDP growth. This makes sense, since I doubt China would be so inclined to devote so much money to Africa if it did not get something more substantial in return.

I also caught that China's Belt and Road Initiative explicitly supports the African Union's 2063 Agenda. This is concerning when one takes into account the warning at the end about Africa's potential vulnerability to authoritarian forms of government and other "Chinese characteristics." It is quite possible that Chinese investment can help along the economic aspirations contained in the Agenda, but the influence China exerts as a result may hamper the more political and social aspirations.

China's investment in Africa shares similarities to their efforts the Arctic. In both regions, China is offering financial assistance to regional actors to promote development (various projects in Africa and resource extraction infrastructure for Russia) as a way of gaining a foothold for itself.

One thing that greatly concerns me about today's document is on page 2 under the subsection "Projecting China's Standard Internationally." In this section it is clear that China cares more about the country than they do about individual rights when it says "Though China's constitution explicitly includes the protection of human rights, and it was a signatory to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and both the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, and the International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights in 1966, the Government has not ratified the latter and has made clear in the pursuit of 'Socialism with these Chinese Characteristics' that individual rights are subordinate to the collective rights embedded in economic, social, and cultural rights both within China and... in countries benefitting from a Chinese presence through aid, investment, trade and security support." This is worrisome because it means that the Chinese will not put individual rights first in countries in Africa, where they are investing. The Chinese are already known for committing many human rights infringements so it is concerning that it is stated that they will continue these trends in other countries around the world. Especially when they are able to control the money going into the country. This could lead to serious human rights abuses around the world.

I appreciated today's document highlighting Africa's concerns about Beijing's motives behind the BRI and other foreign direct investment projects in Asia, as @Alex Gintz noted above. China has largely diversified its investments from purely mineral rich countries to "connectivity" and agriculture projects. While it is good to see that more of Chinese FDI is adding local value and not just export value to China, it is important to note that China is employing these strategies to relieve the economic pressures of China, not Africa. The document also noted transparency and join-country coordination behind China's BRI. The true motives of the initiative are routinely questioned in Africa since Xi Jinping has repeatedly stated his wish to push CCP governing ideals/ values on to developing countries. Coordination between China and recipients of their FDI is also a concern; African countries have no clear idea of the cost-sharing agreements between China and recipients, particularly in investment projects. While FDI is helping Africa become a more stable economic environment, the ambiguity of Chinese investment is of major concern to the continent.

Today's document did very well to mention the role of China's pursuit of international influence in its presence in Africa. While Africa's resources are of utility to China to sustain economic growth, moving into frontier economies and young countries like those in Africa, as well as South America, affords China an opportunity to exert political influence over countries that are still technically only beginning to plant their feet on the world stage. As the document's conclusion explained, this presence and economic dynamic offers China the opportunity to exercise influence over young countries which do not have a history of extensive commitment to human rights, individual freedom, democratic values, etc. This will inevitably continue to pose a challenge to the international community in terms of reaching a consensus or international norm on these topics.